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Sadler v. PacifiCare of Nevada, Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 98 (Dec. 31, 2014)1 
 
TORT LAW: NEGLIGENCE 
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined (1) when stating a claim for a negligence action in which medical 
monitoring is sought as a remedy, a plaintiff may satisfy the injury requirement by alleging that 
additional medical monitoring is reasonably required beyond the standard recommendations.  
 
Background 
 
Jack and Susan Sadler, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similarly situated 
individuals, (“Appellants”), filed a complaint in the district court against PacifiCare of Nevada, 
Inc., (“Respondent”), a health maintenance organization, asserting claims of negligence and 
negligence per se. Appellants claimed Respondent failed to perform its duty to establish and 
implement a quality assurance program to oversee the medical providers within its network. 
Specifically, Appellants alleged Respondent’s failure to provide oversight allowed certain 
providers to use unsafe injection practices, leading Appellants to be exposed to and/or placed at 
risk of contracting blood-borne diseases, requiring subsequent medical monitoring. As relief for 
their negligence claims, Appellants sought to establish a court-supervised medical monitoring 
program at Respondent’s expense.  
Respondent moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Appellant’s complaint 
failed to state a negligence claim as it did not state an ”actual injury,” such as testing positive for 
a blood-borne illness. Appellants opposed the motion, arguing that a sufficient tort claim injury 
does not need to be an actual or physical injury. Appellants asserted Respondent’s negligence 
caused a legal injury, the need for medical monitoring, which was sufficient to support 
negligence claims. The district court granted judgment in favor of Respondent, holding that 
Appellants’ claims were based on a risk of exposure and were insufficient to allege an injury. 
This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
Medical Monitoring 
 
 In determining whether medical monitoring is a remedy for negligence, this appeal 
presents a question of first impression. This court previously considered medical monitoring in 
Badillo v. American Brands, Inc.2 The Badillo court concluded there is no common law cause of 
action for medical monitoring in Nevada, but did not determine if medical monitoring is a viable 
remedy to a tort claim.3  
 
 
                                                        
1
  By Hayley Miller. 
2
  117 Nev. 34, 16 P.3d 435 (2001). Plaintiffs sought a judgment requiring defendant tobacco companies to pay for 
plaintiffs’ ongoing medical monitoring for tobacco-related diseases. Id. at 38, 16 P.3d at 438. 
3
 Id. at 41-44, 16 P.3d at 440-41.  
Negligence 
 
The Court focuses only on the third element of a negligence claim, injury.4 The district 
court’s order and the parties’ arguments in this case are limited to the sufficient pleading of a 
negligence injury. The remaining elements of the negligence claims are left for consideration by 
the district court on remand.5   
 
Injury generally 
 
 Appellants argue they have alleged an injury based on actual exposure to infected blood 
through exposure to other patients’ blood and/or risk of exposure to blood-borne diseases. 
Alternatively, Appellants argue that regardless of exposure, Respondent still caused injury by 
creating Appellants’ need for ongoing medical monitoring. Conversely, Respondent argues 
Appellants must allege a present physical injury, such as contracting an illness.  
 The Court first considered the economic loss doctrine, and held Appellants have suffered 
more than purely economic losses. 6  The Appellants’ exposure and increased risk are 
noneconomic detrimental changes in circumstances that Appellants would not have experienced 
but for the negligence of Respondent.  
 The Court next considered if tort law requires the underlying injury to be physical. In 
Nevada, physical injury may be required to establish certain torts.7 However, as no authority 
specifically requires a party to allege a physical injury to state a negligence claim, the court 
looked to other courts for guidance. 
  
Physical injury in the context of medical monitoring  
  
Although several courts have determined medical monitoring is insufficient to constitute 
a present injury for a negligence claim, the Court did not take such a restricted view.8 The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7(1) (1965) broadly defines an injury as “the invasion of any 
legally protected interest of another,” as well as separately defines “harm” and “physical harm.” 
The differing definitions indicate that injury is generally not limited to physical injury. 
 In accordance with the Restatement, a number of courts have determined the costs of 
medical monitoring may be recovered as either an independent claim or as a tort remedy.9 These 
cases hold that an individual has an interest in avoiding expensive diagnostic examinations like 
                                                        
4
  The four elements of a negligence claim are duty, breach, causation of injury, and damages. DeBoer v. Senior 
Bridges of Sparks Family Hosp., 128 ____, ____, 282 P.3d 727, 732 (2012). 
5
  Because the issue on appeal concerns only whether the Appellants’ sufficiently alleged an injury, the court did not 
distinguish between the negligence and negligence per se claims. 
6
  The economic loss doctrine prevents recovery on an unintentional tort claim for “purely economic losses.” 
Terracon Consultants W., Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Grp., 125 Nev. 66, 73, 206 P.3d 81, 86 (2009). 
7
  See Chowdhry v. NLVH Inc., 109 Nev. 478, 482-83, 851 P.2d 459, 462 (1993) (requiring physical injury to state a 
claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress). 
8
  These cases characterize medical monitoring claims as seeking compensation for the threat of future harm or for 
increased risk of harm. See Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 184 (Or, 2008); Paz v. Brush Engineered 
Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 5 (Miss. 2007); Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 829 (Ala. 
2001). 
9
  See e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Potter v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Ayers v. Twp. Of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).  
avoiding a physical injury, and an invasion of that interest should be compensated.10 Further, 
allowing for medical monitoring recovery supports several important public policy 
considerations, such as deterring irresponsible handling of toxic chemicals, reducing costs by 
preventing or mitigating future illness, and promoting justice by requiring the responsible party 
to pay.11  
After consideration of these authorities, the Court recognized a plaintiff “may state a 
cause of action for negligence with medical monitoring as the remedy without asserting that he 
or she has suffered a present physical injury.” Although medical monitoring may involve 
economic loss, it is accompanied by noneconomic loss including unwillingly enduring unsafe 
injections, increases in risk of contracting latent diseases, and the need for extra medical testing. 
The Court also noted the previously mentioned policy reasons in allowing for recovery. 
The Court did not agree with Respondent’s argument that a need for medical testing 
creates a broad legal injury that would invite superfluous litigation. To sustain a negligence 
claim a plaintiff will still be required to plead and prove the remaining elements, specifically that 
the defendant actually caused the need for medical testing through a breach of duty, and that the 
breach resulted in damages.12  
 
The Sadlers’ Complaint 
  
Appellants’ complaint sufficiently alleges an injury to state a negligence claim. 
Appellants asserted an injury of exposure to and/or risk of contracting blood-borne diseases. 
Alternatively, Appellants contend that the allegations regarding their exposure and a need for 
medical testing is a sufficient injury. Respondent claims an allegation of actual exposure is the 
minimum necessary to state a negligence claim and Appellants have failed to do so.  
 By using “and/or” Appellants failed to connect any particular plaintiff to the allegation of 
exposure. 13  Thus, Appellants have not alleged actual exposure to a blood-borne disease. 
However, actual exposure is not required. In some medical monitoring cases the event creating 
the need for testing is a physical action creating a medical concern.14 Therefore, the relevant 
inquiry for medical monitoring is “whether the negligent act of the defendant caused the plaintiff 
to have a medical need to undergo medical monitoring.” 
 Although Appellants may not have alleged actual exposure to contaminated blood, they 
have alleged exposure to unsafe injection practices causing a need to undergo medical 
monitoring. This is an injury, as this exposure has caused medical testing unnecessary but for 
Respondent’s purported negligence. To require a specific exposure to a contaminant would 
unnecessarily limit recovery for medical monitoring.  
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  Friends For All Children, 746 F.2d at 825. 
11
  Potter, 863 P.2d at 824. 
12
  Given the early stage of the district court action and the Court’s treatment of medical monitoring as a remedy 
instead of a cause of action, the Court declined to identify specific factors that a plaintiff must demonstrate to 
establish entitlement to medical monitoring as a remedy. 
13
  Gregory v. Dillard’s Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473 n.9 (8th Cir. 2009). 
14
  Friends For All Children, 746 F.2d at 819 (holding the need for medical monitoring was caused by “an explosive 
decompression and loss of oxygen.”) 
Conclusion 
 
Appellants have adequately alleged an injury in the form of exposure to unsafe injection 
practices resulting in a need for ongoing medical monitoring to detect any latent diseases that 
may result from those unsafe practices. The district court erred by granting Respondent’s 
summary judgment based on the necessity of Appellants to allege a physical injury. The Court 
reversed the judgment on the pleadings and remanded the matter to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
No physical injury needed to state negligence claim seeking medical monitoring remedy.  
